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1.  Introduction 
The South African apartheid system formally ended with the election of the African National Congress at 
the first all-race elections held in 1994.  These elections concluded 46 years of official racial 
discrimination and inequality that had its roots in social structures, practices and attitudes dating back to 
the early nineteenth century.  Despite the political transformation that has occurred and the elimination 
of overtly discriminatory laws and regulations, ‘the overall consequences of the legacy of apartheid are 
deeply embedded in the polity, society and economy of the country’ (Presidential Commission, 1996) 
potentially undermining the aspirations of the new South African democracy, at least within a reasonable 
time-frame.   
Discrimination in the labour market was at the heart of the apartheid system, resulting in the use of 
non-productivity-related criteria in decisions concerning the allocation and utilisation of labour such as in 
recruitment, remuneration, firing and retrenchment (Presidential Commission, 1996).  Apartheid policies 
adopted by the White-dominated National Party government such as colour barring and job reservation, 
for example through the , constituted statutory forms of racial 
discrimination and have now been repealed.  Labour market outcomes were also conditioned by various 
institutional barriers to labour mobility and through the differential provision of and access to education, 
training and social welfare.  These forms of extra-market discrimination1 have also been subject to 
fundamental reform with, for example, the repeal of the Bantu Urban Areas Act 1945 and the Bantu 
Education Act 1955.  
However the replacement of apartheid legislation by policies designed to tackle the perceived causes 
of racial wage inequality has not as yet proved sufficient to eradicate the established racial wage 
hierarchy.  Figure 1 provides prima facie evidence of the persistence of South Africa’s well-known 
hierarchical wage structure over the period 1993 to 1999. It shows that amongst full-time, regular, civilian, 
non-primary sector, male employees of normal working age, Whites had the highest geometric mean 
wage, followed by Indians/Asians, Coloureds and finally Africans/Blacks who received the lowest 
geometric mean wage of any racial group throughout the period.  Between 1993 and 1995 the overall 
African-White wage differential fell but then this gap stagnated or even rose slightly through the latter half 
of the 1990s.  Thus substantial wage disparities persist five years after the transition to majority 
democratic rule. 
Figure 1:  Geometric mean wages by race as a percentage of the overall geometric mean 
wage, 1993-99 
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1   Extra-market discrimination refers to structural and systemic factors that exist prior to the labour market which condition the supply of 
and demand for labour (Presidential Commission, 1996). 
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Figure 2:  Overall log hourly wage differentials, 1993-99 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
90:10 differential
90:50 differential
50:10 differential
 
A useful parallel may be drawn here with USA and other international experience even though this 
tends to concern discrimination against a minority, rather than the majority as is the case in South Africa.  
In particular, Darity and Mason (1998) and Altonji and Blank (1999) review a large literature on the USA 
labour market which provides evidence that the signal Civil Rights Act of 1964 led to a sustained and 
significant decline in Black/White earnings differentials over the following decade (Donahue and 
Heckman, 1991), but that substantial racial disparities remained which have proved remarkably persistent 
over time.  One possible explanation is put forward by Arrow (1998) who stresses the potential 
importance both of ‘statistical discrimination’ and of social interactions and networks in influencing 
behaviour and perpetuating differential treatment.  Thus the Apartheid policy of residential segregation 
might be expected to have a long-term detrimental impact on the operation of the labour market by 
inhibiting the formation of a genuinely multiracial society.  A second reason may be that previous extra-
market discrimination, particularly in the provision of education, can contribute markedly to continuing 
inequalities in the labour market since disadvantage tends to be self-reproducing and reinforcing.  For 
example, Case and Deaton (1998) have found that in South Africa those with poor education are often 
unable to secure sufficient income to provide for the education of their children.  Finally, Juhn et al. 
(1991, 1993) emphasise the importance of also taking changing returns to skills into account if the 
distribution of those skills is not uniform across racial groups due to either current discrimination or 
enduring patterns of disadvantage.  Specifically, rising skill prices in combination with the fact that 
Africans are relatively concentrated in the lower half of the skills distribution may serve to explain the 
persistence of racial wage disparities. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution of the racial wage hierarchy in South Africa over the 
period 1993 to 1999.  In particular we examine the extent to which broader changes in the overall 
distribution of wages may serve to explain the lack of any sustained convergence in racial wage 
disparities in the post-apartheid era.  Natrass (2000) argues that two forces appear to be acting on the 
wage distribution in South Africa's case: on the one hand, the demand for skilled labour is putting upward 
pressure on the top end of the wage distribution while trade union pressure on the other hand appears 
to be favouring lower paid jobs.  Figure 2 shows that overall wage inequality amongst full-time, regular, 
civilian, non-primary sector, male employees of normal working age, as measured by the logarithm of the 
ratio of the hourly wage rate of the 90th percentile worker to that of the 10th percentile worker, fell 
between 1993 and 1995 but then grew steadily throughout the latter half of the decade.  Between 1995 
and 1999 there was a 9% increase in the 90-10 log wage differential as the net result of a 23% increase 
in the 90-50 differential and a 4% fall in the 50-10 differential. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The following section sets out the decomposition procedures 
that we employ to investigate the changing basis of the racial wage hierarchy.  Section 3 describes the 
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data from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development survey and the 1995 to 
1999 October Household Surveys that we employ in our analysis.  Section 4 presents the empirical 
results on the nature and causes of the evolution of the racial wage hierarchy in the post-Apartheid era.  
In the final section we review the range of policy initiatives that have been taken by the South African 
Government to tackle the legacy of apartheid in the labour market.  
2.  Methodological Framework 
This section presents a multilateral procedure that facilitates investigation of the changing basis of the 
racial wage hierarchy within South Africa by providing a joint decomposition of the logarithmic wage 
differentials between African, Coloured, Indian and White groups. Like other decomposition techniques 
our methodology measures discrimination indirectly as the residual component from an estimated wage 
function.  Changes in this residual component over time should reflect any variation in the extent of wage 
discrimination but may also arise from changes in unmeasured or residual characteristics of the 
workforce and changes in the returns to such characteristics.  We adapt an approach due to Juhn et al. 
(1991) to seek to identify the potential importance of changes in the returns to unobservable 
characteristics in the evolution of the residual wage gap. 
2.1 Multilateral decomposition procedure 
Following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), the gross difference between the mean logarithm of wages 
of racial groups p and q (p, qÎ r=African, Coloured, Indian, White) in period t can be decomposed into 
an explained or predicted difference due to disparities in observable or measured characteristics between 
the two groups, and an unexplained or residual difference attributable to both wage discrimination and 
unmeasured disparities in characteristics.  Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) generalise 
this basic decomposition procedure by explicitly writing the residual difference in terms of the wage that 
each group receives relative to that which it would receive in the absence of discrimination.  In Allanson 
et al. (2000), we further partition both the gross and predicted differences in the mean logarithm of 
wages, to yield the following total decomposition of )W/Wln( qtpt : 
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which may be written as: 
{ } { } { })1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln( qtptqtptqtpt +-+++-+=+-+ ddqqgg ; p, qÎ r;  p¹q      (2) 
On the left-hand side of (2), )1)W/W(( trtrt -=g  is defined as the gross wage differential of group 
r, where rtW  is the geometric mean wage of group r and tW  is the corresponding wage for the entire 
workforce under the (observed) discriminatory wage structure.  On the right hand-side,  
)1)W/W(( *t
*
rtrt -=q  is the predicted wage differential of group r where 
*
rtW  is the geometric mean 
wage of group r and *tW  is the corresponding wage for the entire workforce under the (hypothetical) 
non-discriminatory wage structure. Finally, )1)W/W(( *rtrtrt -=d  represents the residual wage 
differential of group r which reflects the gap between the geometric mean wage of group r workers 
under the two wage structures.  The main advantage of (2) over the standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition is that each component of the equation is expressed as the difference between two terms 
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that is each defined independently of the particular binary comparison that is being made.  The rtg , rtq  
and rtd  coefficients thus constitute a set of sufficient statistics for the multilateral analysis of the racial 
wage hierarchy.  
The implementation of (2) first requires the specification and estimation of a suitable model of wage 
determination under both the discriminatory and non-discriminatory regimes.  Let the observed wage of 
an individual worker h in group r in year t be given by a standard Mincerian wage function: 
rhtrtrhtrht uXwln +¢= b ;     h=1,…nrt ; "r                                                                        (3) 
where rhtw  is the wage of the worker, rhtX  is a vector of observable characteristics associated with 
the worker, rtb  is a conformable vector of group-specific returns to characteristics and rhtu  is defined so 
that E( rhtu | rhtX ) = 0.  If data on wages consist solely of point observations then estimation of (2) by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) using the sample of n  observations on group r workers yields an estimate 
rtbˆ  such that rtrtrt ˆXWln b¢=  where rtX  is the vector of mean values of the observed characteristics 
of group r.  Additionally, OLS estimation of (3) over the pooled sample of size nt = Snrt yields the pooled 
estimate tbˆ  such that ttt ˆXWln b¢=  where tX  is the vector of mean values of the observed 
characteristics of the entire workforce.   
 The appropriate specification for the non-discriminatory wage structure is less well established in 
the literature.2  We assume that neither the characteristics of individual workers nor the form of the wage 
function would change in the absence of discrimination, and specify the non-discriminatory wage 
function for an individual worker i of any race in year t as:  
;uXwln *it
*
tit
*
it +¢= b      i=1,… nt;      nt =S nrt;                                                               (4) 
where *itw  is the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage of the worker, itX  is a vector of observable 
characteristics associated with the worker, *tb  is a conformable vector of non-discriminatory returns to 
characteristics and *itu  is defined so that E(
*
itu | itX ) = 0.  Neumark (1988) provides a theoretical model 
to support the choice of *tbˆ = tbˆ , that is the estimate of the non-discriminatory wage structure 
*
tb  in 
(4) is obtained by the estimation of (3) over the pooled sample of observations generated by the 
discriminatory wage regime.  Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) show that *tbˆ  can be interpreted as a 
weighted combination of the rtbˆ  estimates in (3), though individual elements of 
*
tbˆ  need not be 
bracketed by the corresponding elements of rtbˆ  from the separately estimated racial wage structures.  
The crucial point however for our multilateral decomposition procedure is simply that if t
*
t
ˆˆ bb =  then 
ttt
*
t
ˆXWlnWˆln b¢== , that is our estimates of the overall geometric mean wage are identical under 
the two labour market regimes.  
In practice, OLS estimation of (3) will be infeasible if all or some of the observations on wages take the 
form of interval data as will be the case if workers were not asked to report their exact wage but only 
                                                 
2   Allanson et al. (2000) examine the sensitivity of the results of our multilateral decomposition procedure to the choice of estimator for the 
non-discriminatory wage structure. 
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within which of a set of pre-defined wage brackets the amount fell or if some workers were only 
prepared to respond in this manner.  In general, the use of a generalised Tobit estimator (StataCorp, 
1997, Volume 1, p. 145) will serve to deal with any censoring of the dependent variable while yielding 
identical results to the OLS estimator in the special case in which all observations on wages are reported 
as exact amounts.  We define rtrt
~
rt
~
XWln b¢= , ttt
~ ~
XWln b¢=  and tt
*
tt
~
*
t
~
X
~
XWln bb ¢=¢=  where 
tildas refer to the generalised Tobit estimates, noting that 
~
rtWln  and 
~
tWln  are unbiased but not 
necessarily exact estimators of rtWln  and tWln . 
We proceed to obtain estimates of the various terms in the decomposition equation (2) as:  
ttrtrttrtrt
~
X
~
XWlnWln)1ln{
~~~
bbg ¢-¢=-=+ ;   "r                                                    (5) 
*
ttrt
*
t
*
rtrt
~
)XX(WlnWln)1ln{
~~~
bq ¢-=-=+ ;  "r                                                    (6) 
)
~~
(XWlnWln)1ln{ *trtrt
*
rtrtrt
~~~
bbd -¢=-=+ ;  "r                                                    (7) 
where  )1ln{
~
rt +g  will exactly equal the sum of  )1ln{
~
rt +q and 
~
)1ln{ rt +d  given that 
*
tW
~
ln  is 
equal to 
~
tWln  by construction.  Hence, rt
~g  may be interpreted as the estimated wage differential 
between an average group r worker, with characteristics rtX , and the average worker overall, with 
characteristics tX , under the discriminatory wage structure in period t; rt
~
q  is the estimated wage 
differential between an average group r worker and the average worker overall under the non-
discriminatory wage structure; and rt
~
d  is the estimated wage differential for an average group r worker 
between the two wage structures.  Moreover, the sum of the predicted and residual wage gaps, if both 
are expressed relative to the (common) overall geometric wage, will be equal to the gross wage 
differential:  
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The interpretation of the results of the multilateral decomposition procedure is thus particularly clear 
and intuitive. 
2.2 Analysis of changes over time in racial wage differentials 
The investigation of changes over time in racial wage differentials is complicated by the possibility that 
changes in the residual wage differential can result either from variation in the extent of wage 
discrimination or from changes in the distribution of and returns to unmeasured or unobservable 
characteristics in the workforce or from some combination of the two.  The standard approach (Altonji 
and Blank, 1999) decomposes both the predicted and residual differences in the mean logarithm of 
wages solely in terms of changes in observable characteristics and the returns to those characteristics, 
yielding in the case of our multilateral procedure the following decomposition of the change in the gross 
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difference in the mean logarithm of wages between racial group r and the whole workforce between 
years t and t': 
÷
ø
öç
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æ +-+=÷
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~~~~~~
}1ln{}1ln{ }1ln{}1ln{}1ln{}1ln{ rt'rtrt'rtrt'rt ddqqgg  
( ) ( )'rtrt'rtrt'rtrt*t*'t'rt*trt'rt ~)XX()~~(X)~~(X~)XX( bDbDbDbbDbDD ¢-¢+-¢+-¢+¢-¢= ;  "r     (9) 
where srsrs XXX -=D  (sÎ t, t') is the difference in observable characteristics between the average 
group r and overall average worker and *srsrs
~~~
bbbD -=  (sÎ t, t')3 is the difference between the 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory returns to observable characteristics faced by group r workers.  
Hence that part of the change in the gross difference explained by the model of wage determination is 
equal to the sum of the effects of the change in difference in observable characteristics given the non-
discriminatory wage structure in year t and the change in the non-discriminatory returns to observable 
characteristics given the difference in observable characteristics in year t'.  This leaves the residual or 
unexplained component of the change equal to the sum of the effects of the change in the difference in 
returns to observable characteristics given the average characteristics of group r workers in year t and the 
change in the observable characteristics of the average group r worker given the difference in returns to 
observable characteristics in year t'. 
However, Juhn et al. (1991) argue that the standard approach may give a misleading impression of the 
change in discrimination over the period since part of the change in the residual difference may be due 
to changes either in the racial distribution of unobserved characteristics within the workforce or in the 
returns to those characteristics.  In particular, if returns to unobserved characteristics increase then this 
will lead to apparent increases in discrimination against those groups over-represented in the lower end 
of the residual wage distribution due to inferior unobservable characteristics and in favour of those 
groups with superior unobservable characteristics.  To seek to isolate the potential size of any such effect 
we also construct an alternative decomposition of the change in the residual difference in (9) that 
provides a measure which may be interpreted as the change in returns to unobserved characteristics if 
residual wage differences are entirely due to disparities in unobserved characteristics and the overall 
distribution of such characteristics is constant over time.  If these conditions were to hold then the model 
of wage determination would be given by (4) and, following Juhn et al. (1991), we can write tititu se=  
where ite is a 'standardised' disturbance term (with a mean of zero and a variance of one) that may be 
interpreted as a measure of unobserved characteristics and the residual standard deviation of wages ts  
is interpreted as the return to those characteristics in year t.  Using this notation (5) may be re-written as: 
trt
*
trtttrt
*
ttrt
*
t
*
rtrt
~~~X~)~~(~)XX(WlnWln)1ln{
~~~
seDbDseebg +¢=-+¢-¢=-=+ ;  "r                    (10) 
where the first equality holds by assumption, rt
~e  and t
~e  are respectively the group r and overall 
average standardised regression residuals, and rt
~eD  ( rt
~e=  since t
~e =0 by construction) is the difference 
in unmeasured characteristics between the average group r and overall average worker.  The change in 
                                                 
3 If an element of rs
~bD is defined in period t but not in t' then we assume that rt'rt
~~ bDbD = , i.e. the difference between the 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory returns to the characteristic is the same in the two periods.  By construction, if an element of 
rs
~bD is not defined then the value of the corresponding element of rsX will be zero. 
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the residual difference may then be re-written from (9) as: 
)~~(~~)~~(}1ln{}1ln{ t't'rttrt'rtrt'rt
~~
sseDseDeDdd -+-=+-+               (11) 
where the decomposition parallels the decomposition of the change in the predicted difference in (9).  
Thus the change in the residual difference is equal to the sum of the effects of the change in difference in 
unobservable characteristics given the returns to those characteristics in year t and the change in returns 
to unobservable characteristics given the difference in unobservable characteristics in year t'. 
Implementation of (11) first requires the imputation of residuals for those observations with interval wage 
data:  we calculate a point estimate of the residual as the expected value of the residual conditional on 
the predicted wage for that observation.  Computation of trt
~~ seD  and 't'rt
~~ seD  is then straightforward 
while t'rt
~~ seD  may be calculated as the average of the group r residuals that would have been observed 
in year t if group r workers had held the same positions in the year t residual wage distribution that they 
had held in the year t' residual wage distribution.  The latter procedure suggests the alternative 
interpretation of (11) as the sum of the effects of the movement of group r workers within the overall 
distribution of unobserved characteristics holding the returns to those characteristics constant and the 
change in the returns to unobservable characteristics holding the distribution of group r workers within 
the overall distribution of unobserved characteristics constant.   
3.  Data 
The data for the study are principally drawn from the October Household Surveys (OHSs) that have been 
conducted annually by Statistics South Africa4 (1995a, 1995b, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b) 
since 1993.  The OHSs are based on probability samples of large numbers of households (ranging from 
16000 to 30000) and cover a range of development indicators.  One of the main purposes of the OHSs 
is to obtain indicators of the size of the economically active population in South Africa with special 
reference to the number of unemployed persons.  Employees in all formal as well as informal business 
sectors are covered by the OHS since the survey is based on households, not businesses.  Prior to the 
introduction of the Labour Force Survey in January 2000, the OHS was the only source of official data on 
the hours and earnings of individual workers in South Africa. 
The OHSs form an ongoing series, but each OHS was conducted an independent survey and the 
resultant data sets are not completely comparable due to changes in target population, sample design 
and methodology, and questionnaire content and wording.  In particular, the 1993 OHS neither covered 
the whole of South Africa due to the exclusion of the former bantustan states of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states) nor collected sufficient information on employment to 
support the wage function analysis.  Nor does the 1994 OHS provide suitable data for comparison due 
to both limitations in the sampling method and differences in the way in which the pay/salary questions 
were asked.5  In place of these first two OHSs we use the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) survey6 which was undertaken during the nine months leading up to the country's 
first democratic elections at the end of April 1994 and provides data on the characteristics and 
                                                 
4  Formerly the Central Statistical Service. 
5 The OHS has typically asked for information on total salary/pay before deductions.  But the 1994 OHS asked respondents for their total 
pay and then followed this up with questions on whether the stated amount was before or after deductions and, if and only if total pay 
before deductions had been reported, the amount of any such deductions.  As a result, gross pay data is only available for a sub-sample of 
workers which does not appear to be representative based on exploratory analysis of the data.  
6 To test the comparability of the data from the PSLSD survey with that from the 1993 OHS, we conducted a parallel decomposition 
analysis based on a common restricted sample definition and wage function specification.  The two sets of results are broadly similar with 
the exception of Indians who appear to command a much lower geometric mean wage (and hence gross wage premium) from the PSLSD 
survey than from the 1993 OHS data.  
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employment conditions of individual workers drawn from a representative sample of nearly 9000 
households7 covering the whole of South Africa.  The PSLSD was conducted by the Southern Africa 
Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town with technical 
support from the World Bank (SALDRU, 1994).  
For our analysis of racial wage rate differentials we initially restricted the sample to men between the 
ages of 15 and 65 who were in full-time, regular employment8 in any economic activity other than 
agriculture forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, and the armed services.  We excluded female, part-
time and casual workers on the grounds that these categories of workers might face discrimination on 
the basis of gender and employment status, which could bias our estimates of the extent of racial wage 
discrimination.  The age restrictions limit the sample to adults not engaged in retirement occupations.  
Workers in the agricultural sector are excluded due to inconsistencies in the enumeration of agricultural 
workers caused by changes in OHS sampling methodology (Statistics South Africa, 2000c: iv), most 
notably in the identification procedure for non-urban areas between the 1995 and 1996 OHSs (Statistics 
South Africa, 1999b).  Workers in the mining industry are excluded since the sampling frames of the 
various OHSs did not adequately cover mining hostels prior to 1998.  Finally, South African Defence 
force members are excluded, as the 1995 OHS does not contain a detailed breakdown of military 
occupations. 
We further restricted the sample to those workers for which we could calculate reliable estimates of 
gross hourly wages and for which no data were missing on the common set of independent variables 
specified in the wage functions.  Information on pay or salary is reported only in exact terms in the 
PSLSD, only within pre-specified intervals in the (1993 and) 1996 OHS and as a mixture of point and 
interval observations in all other OHSs.  Gross hourly wage rates were calculated from both the PSLSD 
and OHS data by converting all reported gross pay data to a weekly basis and dividing by hours worked 
in the past seven days.  Nevertheless, neither survey is ideally suited for this purpose because the 
information on hours worked relate to the total hours worked by an individual in all economic activities 
whereas the information on pay relates to total salary/pay (including overtime and bonus9 but before 
deductions) in main employment.  To ensure the reliability of our hourly wage rate estimates we 
therefore excluded those employees who either had not worked at least 35 hours in the past seven 
days,10 or could be identified as being engaged in economic activities other than their main job (either as 
employees11 or on own account12), or had reported earnings on a daily basis.  The surveys also provide 
comparable data on various worker and job attributes, including age, educational attainment, region of 
residence, occupation, industry and trade union membership, which are used to specify a common set of 
determinants of the wage function.   
Finally, we seek to clean the data of any outliers which may give rise to grossly influential observations. 
Of particular concern are apparent clerical errors in the data for some observations on wages and hours 
worked.  For example, in the 1999 OHS there are the cases of a African bricklayer and a White manager 
both in the construction industry who are respectively reported as earning R5 per month for a 45 hour 
week and R600035 per month for a 42 hour week.  Errors may also be present in the data on worker 
                                                 
7 In the PSLSD, a household is defined as a single person or group of people who have lived together for at least 15 days out of the past 
year, who eat together and who share resources. To ensure compatibility with the OHS, we further require that individuals were present 
for more than 15 of the last 30 days.  
8 The PSLSD survey only distinguishes between regular wage employment (including self-employed professionals) and casual wage 
employment so full-time status is identified on the basis of hours worked in the past week.  The 1995 and 1996 OHSs only distinguish 
between full-time and part-time employment whereas later OHSs also include casual employment as a separate category.  
9   The OHS questionnaires did not explicitly state that bonuses should be included in total pay prior to 1996.  The 1999 OHS questionnaire 
further specifies that allowances should be included. 
10  The 1997 and subsequent OHSs further allow us to identify workers who worked a 'normal' week in the past seven days.  Limiting the 
sample to these workers does not appear to appreciably affect the results of the decomposition analysis.  
11  The OHS does not enable workers holding multiple jobs to be identified prior to 1997. 
12  The PSLSD does not enable employees who also work on their own account to be identified.  
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and employment characteristics but since these variables are either categorical or naturally bounded then 
normal checks for data consistency may be expected to clean the sample of such cases. We use a 
method for the identification of multiple outliers due to Hadi and Simonoff (1993) which is relatively 
resistant to both masking and swamping effects and does not require the number of potential outliers to 
be arbitrarily set in advance.  The first step is to establish a clean sub-set of size M by estimating the 
regression model using the full sample of size n, sorting the observations in ascending order of the 
internally studentised residuals and then selecting the first M=s observations where s is the minimum 
number of observations in the ordered sequence necessary for the data matrix to have full rank. The next 
step increases the size of the clean sub-set by one: the regression model is re-estimated using the clean 
sub-set, the observations sorted in ascending order of the adjusted residuals (where the adjusted residual 
is equal to the internally studentised residual for observations within the clean sub-set and to the scaled 
prediction error for all other observations) and a new clean sub-set formed from the first M+1 
observations in the ordered sequence where M is the size of the old clean sub-set.  This step is repeated 
until either the absolute size of the M+1'th adjusted residual in the ordered sequence is greater than the 
appropriate Bonferoni critical value of the t-statistic or the clean sub-set is equal to the full sample.  In the 
first case the M+1'th through n'th ordered observations are declared outliers and deleted from the 
sample; in the latter there are no outliers to delete.   
For the purposes of outlier identification we treated each data set as a simple random sample and 
estimated the wage function (3) over the pooled set of observations to establish the initial clean sub-set.  
Ideally, we would have wished to use the generalised Tobit estimator for the next step of the procedure 
but encountered convergence problems with the estimator when M is small.  So we restricted the 
estimation of the wage function with the clean sub-set to that sub-sample of the clean observations for 
which exact wage data were available, with some consequential loss of efficiency.  However we did test 
for potential outliers in all observations by calculating a point estimate of the residual for those 
observations with interval wage data as the expected value of the residual conditional on the predicted 
wage for that observation.   Choosing a 5% significance level we found up to 2.1% of outliers in the 
PSLSD data but no more than 0.4% in any OHS data set and none at all in the 1995 and 1997 OHSs.   
The 1996 OHS data set contains only interval observations on wages and therefore was not cleaned. 
The final cleaned samples varied in size from 2200 observations in the PSLSD data to more than 9700 
in the 1995 OHS data.  The size of the workforce covered by our samples increased from 2.38 million 
workers in 1993 to 3.25 million workers in 1995 before declining gradually back to 2.30 million in 1999.  
The racial composition of this workforce was relatively stable over the years, with the African share of the 
workforce rising from 58% in 1993 to 63% in 1999, the White share falling from 25% to 20% and the 
proportion of Coloured and Indian workers roughly constant at 12% and 5% respectively .  The average 
age of the workforce was 36 years throughout the period with comparatively little variation between 
racial groups.  This racial uniformity is the result both of demographic factors and of labour participation 
rates with high levels of youth unemployment, particularly amongst Africans (Standing et al., 1996).  The 
educational background of the racial groups differs markedly with over 80% of White workers and 60% 
of Indians having completed at least a secondary education in comparison to the 35% of Coloured 
workers and 25% of Africans with no more than a primary education in 1997.  Such racial disparities are, 
in part, the outcome of past apartheid educational policies such as the Bantu Education Act 1955, which 
limited the provision of schooling to native Africans.  Non-White educational standards were improved 
following the de Lange Commission 1979 and, more recently, the passage of the National Education 
Policy Act 1996.  But any resultant convergence in the educational attainment of workers is inevitably 
slow given both the low rate of turnover of the labour force and the perpetuation of disadvantage caused 
by household financial constraints to participation in education (Case and Deaton, 1998): more than 
25% of the workers in 1995 who were in the age range 15 to 24 and had not obtained Standard 10 
reported that they wished to continue with their education but did not have enough money to do so.  
Members of all racial groups participated in all occupations and sectors within the highly diversified 
economy.  But the relatively low levels of education received by African and Coloured workers was 
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reflected in a marked over-representation of African and Coloured workers in unskilled and semi-skilled 
occupational groups as compared to Indians and Whites who were more likely to work in white-collar 
occupations.  However, the proportion of African and Coloured employment in white-collar jobs has 
more than doubled since the end of apartheid, particularly due to a greater presence in education and 
other public sector activities.  More than 40% of the workforce were trade union members in 1995, with 
participation rates increasing among all groups in the post-apartheid period.  Finally, the raised sample 
statistics reveal particular regional concentrations of Indians in Kwazulu/Natal and of Coloureds in 
Western Cape, surrounding Cape Town, with far more uniform distributions of Whites and Africans.  
These distributions strongly reflect historic settlement patterns and the influence of legislation, such as the 
Group Areas Act 1950. 
4.  Multilateral Decomposition of the Racial Wage Hierarchy 
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics on the hierarchical wage structure based on our sample data.  It 
shows that Whites had the highest geometric mean wage, followed by Indians, Coloureds and finally 
Africans who received the lowest geometric mean wage of any racial group throughout the period.  
Following the transition to democratic rule, geometric mean wages initially rose for all groups but then 
stagnated throughout much of the latter half of the 1990s.  This finding might appear to contradict 
evidence of persistent wage growth from sources such as the Survey of Average Monthly Earnings, but it 
must be remembered that the figures reported in Table 1 are geometric not arithmetic mean wages and 
do not control for changes in workforce characteristics, including occupational and sectoral composition.  
This section provides an analysis of the evolving pattern of racial wage disparities.  
Table 1 : Geometric Mean Hourly Wages by Racial Group, 1993-1999. 
  Racial group 
 All races African Coloured Indian White 
 Rand/hr 
1993 8.65 5.59 7.43 11.31 23.55 
      1995 10.01 7.68 7.93 12.89 22.54 
1996 9.60 7.23 8.87 13.06 22.77 
1997 9.47 6.94 9.24 13.62 23.14 
1998 9.66 6.97 10.37 13.86 22.11 
1999 10.97 8.03 11.05 14.19 26.93 
Source: Authors’ estimates from wage function regressions.   
The practical implementation of the decomposition procedures requires the prior specification and 
estimation of the wage function for each racial group and for all groups together in each year.13  To 
facilitate the subsequent analysis, the log of the hourly wage was specified in each wage regression as a 
function of an identical set of explanatory variables: age, age squared, years of primary, secondary, 
diploma and university education, occupational category, economic sector, trade union membership and 
region of residence.  Estimation of these functions is based on samples of full-time, regular, civilian 
employees working outwith the primary sector and therefore may be subject to sample selection bias.  
This issue is of particular concern in the study because full-time labour absorption rates differ both 
between racial groups and over the period of comparison.  And although there is no necessary 
connection between changes in labour absorption and selectivity bias (see Blau and Beller, 1988), the 
decomposition of the change in the residual term in terms of a common and invariant distribution of 
unmeasured skills is nevertheless more plausible if the estimation results may be taken to represent the 
unconditional wage (offer) functions rather than merely the (observed) wage functions conditional upon 
sample selection.  
                                                 
13 Availability of space prevents the presentation of these wage functions.  They can however be obtained from the authors on request. 
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Mwabu and Schultz (2000), in their study of the South African labour market based on the PSLSD data 
set, have previously sought to identify the selection into full-time regular employment from a combination 
of land use rights and financial asset variables and found negligible sample selection bias.  However, both 
the PSLSD and the OHS data contain a broader set of variables that the labour economics literature 
might suggest were of relevance in the determination of employment status.  Thus the range of jobs for 
which individuals apply and their willingness to accept any such offers as are made, may be influenced by 
personal and household circumstances that affect their job search activities and reservation wage but not 
their subsequent performance in any employment that they may choose to undertake.  Moreover, 
employers may also take some personal and household circumstances of individuals into account in 
making hiring and firing decisions but not in their determination of wage schedules.  
We therefore sought to model sample selection not only as a function of individuals' age, education 
and region of residence, but also of their marital status, position within the household, health status, 
disability status, housing tenure and type, and access to farmland.  In all cases, both the full set of 
explanatory variables and the sub-set of identifying variables were jointly significant in the individual 
probit equations.  We also found the Heckman selection correction variables obtained from the probit 
equations to be significant in a number of the wage function regressions.  But, the resultant coefficient 
estimates of the wage functions were not robust due to severe collinearity problems caused by the 
inclusion of the Heckman variable: condition numbers of the augmented data matrices were calculated 
and found to be greatly in excess of the recommended maximum of 20 (Leung and Yu, 1996).  We were 
therefore forced to restrict estimation to the wage functions conditional on sample selection, thereby 
limiting the interpretation of the results.  
For estimation, we used a generalised Tobit estimator (StataCorp, 1997) to deal with the mixture of 
point and interval data on the dependent variable in the wage functions.  Observations were weighted to 
reflect projections of population size based on the 1991 Census in the case of the PSLSD and on the 
1996 Census, as adjusted by a post-enumeration survey,  in the case of all of the OHS data sets.  
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors were calculated that allow for the clustering of the samples, 
with the EA identified as the PSU.  However we did not allow for the stratification of the samples as the 
data do not enable the explicit identification of stratum in all years.  This failure to take the complex 
sample design fully into account may be expected to have given rise to needlessly large estimates of the 
standard errors.  Nevertheless, many of the coefficients were individually significant at the 5% level or 
higher, with signs generally conforming to expectations.  And  the overall fit of the wage function 
regressions as measured by the c2 statistic was highly significantly different from zero in all regressions.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from the multilateral decomposition analysis based on the estimated 
wage functions.  The first part of Table 2 presents the crude estimates of the gross, predicted and residual 
differences between the mean logarithm of wages of each of the four racial groups and that of the entire 
population under the hypothetical, non-discriminatory wage structure.  Table 3 presents the results from 
the analysis of changes in these differences: changes in the gross differences are the sum of the changes 
in the corresponding predicted and residual differences, which are in turn broken down in (A) on the 
basis of (9) in terms of changes in measured or observable characteristics and the returns to those 
characteristics and in (B) on the basis of (11) in terms of changes in the levels of and returns to residual or 
unobservable characteristics.  Note that all of the changes are measured relative to a common base year 
t of 1993 and thus may be interpreted loosely as cumulative changes to date since the end of the 
Apartheid regime.  
The second part of Table 2 restates the crude decomposition results in a more readily intelligible form 
by expressing the corresponding gross, predicted and residual wage gaps in terms of the percentage of 
the overall geometric mean wage in each year as in (8).  Thus the typical African, Coloured, Indian and 
White worker of 1993 earned 35% less, 14% less, 31% more and 172% more respectively than the 
overall geometric wage rate of R8.65 per hour paid to the overall average worker in that year.  These 
gross wage differences can largely be explained by quantifiable differences between the various racial 
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groups, especially in educational and occupational attainment.  Taking all observable characteristics into 
account, the typical African, Coloured, Indian and White worker of 1993 would have earned 26% less, 
13% less, 26% more and 102% more respectively than the typical worker under the hypothetical, non-
discriminatory wage structure in that year.  The remainder of the gross wage differentials are then 
accounted for by the residual wage differentials which allow both for wage discrimination and for 
disparities in unobservable characteristics.  
Changes over time in the pattern of the gross wage differentials point to two distinct sub-periods in the 
evolution of the wage hierarchy.  The first sub-period between 1993 and 1995 is marked by significant 
compression of the overall wage hierarchy together with a slight degree of polarisation between the 
wage rates of Africans and Coloureds on the one hand and those of Indians and Whites on the other. 
The most noticeable result is a fall in the African-White wage gap from 208% to 160% of the overall 
geometric mean wage which is due to both the improvement in the relative position of Africans and the 
deterioration in that of Whites.  In addition, the Coloured-Indian wage gap rose slightly from 45% to 50% 
of the overall geometric mean wage while both the African-Coloured and Indian-White wage gaps fell 
significantly.  The subsequent sub-period from 1995 through 1999 shows some reversal in these trends.  
In particular, there is a partial reversal of the reduction in the African-White wage gap and the gross wage 
gap of Coloureds falls to such an extent that the typical Coloured worker no longer receives less than the 
overall geometric mean wage by 1999. Thus the transition to democratic rule in 1994 was accompanied 
by an improvement in the wage position of the majority African workforce relative to all other racial 
groups, but these gains were not fully preserved through the latter half of the decade. 
Table 3 shows that the changes in the wage hierarchy have been largely due to movements in 
predicted wage differences rather than in residual wage differences which show little change over the 
period.   Moreover, the significant falls in both the African predicted wage deficit and the White 
predicted wage premium between 1993 and 1995, and the virtual elimination of the Coloured wage 
deficit by 1999 can be shown to be largely the outcome of two mutually reinforcing factors.  The first is 
the absolute and relative improvement in the levels of educational and occupational attainment of 
Africans and Coloureds workers which can be shown to almost entirely account for the significant 
reductions in predicted wage differences due to the effects of changes in the distribution of observable 
characteristics with returns held at the levels that would have been observed in a non-discriminatory 
labour market in 1993.  The second is changes in these non-discriminatory returns over time which have 
had the effect of further reducing the predicted wage differences given the racial distribution of 
observable characteristics.   
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Table 2: Multilateral Decomposition of Hourly Wage Differentials by Racial Group 
 Racial Group 
 African Coloured Indian White 
 
 
Coeff.  Std.  
Error 
Coeff.  Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
)1~ln( i +g  1993 -0.436# 0.023  -0.151# 0.054  0.268# 0.046  1.002# 0.043  
         1995 -0.265# 0.008  -0.232# 0.021  0.253# 0.027  0.812# 0.014  
1996 -0.283# 0.014  -0.079* 0.039  0.308# 0.045  0.864# 0.028  
1997 -0.312# 0.010  -0.025  0.020  0.363# 0.033  0.893# 0.021  
1998 -0.327# 0.018  0.071  0.046  0.361# 0.054  0.828# 0.033  
1999 -0.313# 0.012  0.007  0.029  0.257# 0.049  0.898# 0.010  
         
)1~ln( i +q  1993 -0.303# 0.010  -0.141# 0.036  0.229# 0.036  0.703# 0.023  
         1995 -0.142# 0.004  -0.220# 0.014  0.109# 0.016  0.497# 0.009  
1996 -0.178# 0.007  -0.083# 0.022  0.182# 0.032  0.570# 0.016  
1997 -0.183# 0.005  -0.058# 0.015  0.238# 0.018  0.545# 0.012  
1998 -0.213# 0.009  0.033# 0.028  0.219# 0.032  0.551# 0.018  
1999 -0.186# 0.006  -0.016  0.018  0.104# 0.028  0.555# 0.015  
         
)1~ln( i +d  1993 -0.133# 0.018  -0.010  0.046  0.040  0.051  0.299# 0.033  
         1995 -0.122# 0.007  -0.013  0.018  0.144# 0.027  0.315# 0.015  
1996 -0.105# 0.010  0.005  0.029  0.126* 0.053  0.294# 0.026  
1997 -0.129# 0.008  0.033  0.018  0.125# 0.034  0.348# 0.020  
1998 -0.113# 0.014  0.038  0.035  0.142# 0.054  0.277# 0.030  
1999 -0.127# 0.010  0.022  0.025  0.153# 0.050  0.343# 0.028  
 Percentages of overall geometric mean wage 
i
~g  1993 -35.3  -14.0  30.8  172.3  
         1995 -23.2  -20.7  28.8  125.2  
1996 -24.6  -7.6  36.0  137.3  
1997 -26.8  -2.5  43.8  144.3  
1998 -27.9  7.3  43.4  128.8  
1999 -26.9  0.7  29.3  145.4  
i
~q  1993 -26.1  -13.2  25.7  101.9  
         1995 -13.3  -19.7  11.5  64.3  
1996 -16.3  -8.0  20.0  76.8  
1997 -16.7  -5.6  26.9  72.5  
1998 -19.2  3.4  24.4  73.5  
1999 -16.9  -1.5  11.0  74.2  
)1
~
(
~
ii +qd  1993 -9.2  -0.9  5.1  70.4  
         1995 -10.0  -1.0  17.3  60.8  
1996 -8.4  0.4  16.1  60.5  
1997 -10.0  3.1  16.9  71.8  
1998 -8.7  4.0  19.0  55.4  
1999 -9.9  2.2  18.3  71.3  
 Percentage of group-specific geometric mean non-discriminatory wage 
i
~d  1993 -12.4  -1.0  4.0  34.9  
         1995 -11.5  -1.3  15.5  37.0  
1996 -10.0  0.5  13.4  34.2  
1997 -12.1  3.3  13.4  41.6  
1998 -10.7  3.8  15.2  31.9  
1999 -11.9  2.2  16.5  40.9  
Notes:  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 3: Decomposition of changes in gross, predicted and residual differences since 1993: 
(a) in terms of changes in the levels of and returns to observed characteristics  
(b) in terms of changes in the levels of and returns to unobserved characteristics 
 Racial Group 
 African Coloured Indian White 
Base year 1993 Coeff.  Std.  Error 
Coeff.  Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
 Gross change in )1~ln( i +g by:-  1995 0.171# 0.024  -0.081  0.058  -0.016  0.053  -0.190# 0.045  
1996 0.153# 0.027  0.073  0.067  0.039  0.064  -0.138# 0.051  
1997 0.124# 0.025  0.126* 0.058  0.095  0.057  -0.108* 0.048  
1998 0.109# 0.029  0.222# 0.071  0.092  0.071  -0.174# 0.054  
1999 0.123# 0.026  0.158* 0.061  -0.011  0.067  -0.104* 0.044  
 Gross change in )1
~
ln( i +q by:-  1995 0.161# 0.011  -0.078* 0.039  -0.120# 0.039  -0.206# 0.025  
1996 0.126# 0.013  0.058  0.043  -0.047  0.048  -0.133# 0.028  
1997 0.120# 0.011  0.084* 0.040  0.009  0.040  -0.157# 0.026  
1998 0.090# 0.014  0.175# 0.046  -0.010  0.048  -0.152# 0.029  
   (A) due to changes in:- 
1999 0.117# 0.012  0.126# 0.041  -0.124# 0.046  -0.148# 0.028  
                     observable 1995 0.125# 0.014  -0.020  0.053  -0.106* 0.052  -0.142# 0.031  
                     characteristics  1996 0.096# 0.014  0.077  0.052  0.007  0.052  -0.066* 0.031  
1997 0.097# 0.015  0.056  0.053  0.016  0.052  -0.070* 0.032  
1998 0.073# 0.015  0.091  0.052  0.030  0.053  -0.060  0.033  
1999 0.104# 0.014  0.053  0.052  -0.105* 0.054  -0.068* 0.032  
                              returns to 1995 0.035# 0.011  -0.059  0.041  -0.014  0.041  -0.064# 0.022  
                     observable 1996 0.030* 0.012  -0.019  0.044  -0.053  0.050  -0.067* 0.027  
                     characteristics  1997 0.023* 0.011  0.028  0.041  -0.007  0.042  -0.087# 0.025  
1998 0.017  0.014  0.084  0.047  -0.040  0.050  -0.092# 0.029  
1999 0.013  0.011  0.073  0.041  -0.019  0.048  -0.080# 0.027  
         Gross change in )1
~
ln( i +d by:-  1995 0.011  0.019  -0.003  0.049  0.104  0.058  0.016  0.036  
1996 0.028  0.021  0.015  0.054  0.086  0.073  -0.005  0.042  
1997 0.004  0.020  0.043  0.049  0.086  0.061  0.049  0.039  
1998 0.019  0.023  0.048  0.057  0.102  0.074  -0.022  0.045  
   (A) due to changes in:- 
1999 0.006  0.021  0.032  0.052  0.113  0.071  0.044  0.043  
                     returns to 1995 0.044* 0.019  0.020  0.050  0.087  0.067  -0.035  0.083  
                     observable 1996 0.058# 0.021  0.032  0.058  0.141  0.077  0.008  0.047  
                     characteristics  1997 0.023  0.020  0.082  0.051  0.026  0.068  0.041  0.044  
1998 0.053* 0.023  0.068  0.057  0.139  0.080  0.023  0.047  
1999 0.046* 0.021  0.075  0.054  0.303# 0.111  0.044  0.084  
                              observable 1995 -0.033# 0.010  -0.023  0.027  0.018  0.051  0.051  0.077  
                     characteristics  1996 -0.030* 0.014  -0.017  0.046  -0.055  0.079  -0.013  0.042  
1997 -0.019  0.011  -0.039  0.029  0.060  0.056  0.008  0.035  
1998 -0.034  0.020  -0.020  0.049  -0.037  0.082  -0.045  0.045  
   (B) due to changes in:- 
1999 -0.040# 0.015  -0.043  0.038  -0.190  0.110  0.000  0.082  
                     returns to 1995 0.014   ~   -0.001   ~   -0.024   ~   -0.042   ~ 
                     unobservable 1996 -0.001   ~   0.002   ~   0.007   ~   0.010   ~ 
                     characteristics  1997 -0.004   ~   0.002   ~   0.005   ~   0.014   ~ 
1998 -0.005   ~   0.002   ~   0.012   ~   0.014   ~ 
1999 -0.009   ~   0.004   ~   0.018   ~   0.025   ~ 
                                           unobservable 1995 -0.004 ~ -0.002 ~ 0.128 ~ 0.057 ~
                     characteristics  1996 0.029   ~   0.012   ~   0.079   ~   -0.014   ~ 
1997 0.009   ~   0.041   ~   0.081   ~   0.035   ~ 
1998 0.024   ~   0.045   ~   0.090   ~   -0.037   ~ 
1999 0.014   ~   0.028   ~   0.096   ~   0.019   ~ 
Notes:  # Significant at the 1% level.  * Significant at the 5% level.   ~ Not computed. 
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None of the gross changes in the residual wage differences are significantly different from zero.  
Nevertheless, the results from the two decomposition procedures are of some interest. The standard 
approach (A) accounts for changes in the residual wage difference in terms of changes in the returns to 
and levels of observable characteristics, where racial differences in returns may reflect the effects either 
of discrimination or of unobserved disparities in the quality of observable characteristics.  The results 
show a slight but statistically significant fall in the degree of underpayment faced by Africans in the post-
apartheid era holding the observed characteristics of the workforce constant (together with an offsetting 
effect due to changes in the relative characteristics of the African workforce).  But the observed 
(discriminatory) returns of all races rise relative to the hypothesised returns in a non-discriminatory labour 
market, so the degree of African underpayment has not in fact fallen relative to any other racial group.  
Thus evidence of any reduction in the extent of either wage discrimination or racial disparities in the 
quality of observable characteristics is at best negligible.  
The alternative decomposition (B) permits an interpretation in terms of changes in the returns to and 
levels of unobservable characteristics if residual wage differences are entirely due to disparities in 
unobserved characteristics and the overall distribution of such characteristics is constant over time.  The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the persistence of residual wage differences in the post-
Apartheid era is due in part to a general increase in the dispersion of wages.   In particular, the relative 
wage position of Africans, who were concentrated at the bottom of the residual wage distribution, 
deteriorated between 1995 and 1999 due to an increase in returns to unobservable characteristics 
(though this effect is more than offset by an improvement in those characteristics).  Nonetheless, the 
absolute sizes of the effects due to changing returns to unobservable characteristics are so small as to 
suggest that broader changes in the overall distribution of wages were not an important cause of the 
persistence of residual wage differences. 
Overall, the changes in racial wage differences have the somewhat unexpected consequence that the 
extent to which the racial wage hierarchy can be explained on the basis of racial disparities in observable 
characteristics has fallen, not risen, following the end of the Apartheid regime.  The final part of Table 2 
reports the amount by which a racial group was underpaid/overpaid relative to the wage it would have 
received in the hypothesised non-discriminatory labour market.  Thus in 1999 the wages of a typical 
African, Coloured, Indian and White worker were respectively 12% lower, 2% higher, 17% higher and 
41% higher than they would have been in the absence of both unobserved racial disparities in 
characteristics and wage discrimination. 
5.  Discussion  
The central theme of this paper is the way that the racial wage hierarchy evolved in South Africa over the 
period 1993 to 1999 amongst full-time regular employees of normal working age, but excluding those in 
the primary sector and the defence forces.  We find that the transition to democratic rule in 1994 was 
accompanied by an improvement in the wage position of the majority African workforce relative to all 
other racial groups, but that these gains were not fully preserved through the latter half of the decade.  
The persistence of racial wage differences following the repeal of all overt discriminatory laws and 
regulations points to the need for concerted policy interventions to reverse the legacy of apartheid.  
However, it is important to identify the various sources of this labour market inequality in order to devise 
appropriate remedial programmes and to monitor their impact on labour market outcomes.  
Our multilateral decomposition analysis indicates that the racial wage hierarchy at the end of the 
apartheid era can largely be explained by quantifiable differences between racial groups, especially in 
educational and occupational attainment.  Since then, the entire education system has been 
systematically reformed through the passage of the South African Schools Act 1996, the Further Education 
and Training Act 1998 and the Higher Education Act 1997.  Schooling has been made compulsory for all 
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children aged seven to fourteen and funding increased significantly with government expenditure on 
education rising from R31.8 billion in 1994 to R51.1 billion in 2000 (Department of Education, 2001).  
Our (unreported) wage regressions exhibit positive returns to post-primary education for all races (see 
also Moll, 1996; Allanson et al., 2000; Mwabu and Schultz, 2000), providing non-Whites with the 
incentives to take advantage of the new opportunities.  Nevertheless, household finances may constrain 
participation in education, frustrating attempts to further narrow predicted wage differentials in the 
absence of significant income and wealth redistribution.   
New employment legislation has also been introduced within the general framework established by the 
Labour Relations Act 1995.  In particular, the Employment Equity Act 1998 requires employers to 
implement affirmative action measures, including preferential treatment and racial employment targets, to 
ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified non-Whites in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workforce.  However the experience of the USA in a similar situation suggests that some 
forms of discrimination can be extremely persistent and difficult to counter by legislation.  In particular, 
the racial segregation of housing in South Africa may maintain labour market segregation through 
recruitment via local networks and help to sustain employers' beliefs in racial differences (Arrow, 1998). 
Standing et al. (1996), and Case and Deaton (1998) provide evidence of informal screening devices 
adopted in the South African labour market. 
The remainder of the racial wage differentials observed in 1993 is due to the combined effects of wage 
discrimination and unquantifiable differences between racial groups.  Discrimination in remuneration was 
made illegal by, inter alia, the Labour Relations Act 1995 which gave effect to the Constitutional right to 
fair labour practices.  Employees were further given the right by the Employment Equity Bill 1998 to 
institute proceedings through the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration for alleged 
discrimination, with the burden of proof falling on the employer (Barker, 1999).  These various labour 
market measures provide powerful instruments to counter the discriminatory practices that have 
sustained the overpayment of Whites and the underpayment of other races.  
Residual wage differentials may also be reduced by the fundamental reform of the education system to 
the extent that this serves to decrease unquantifiable differences between racial groups.  In particular, the 
more equitable distribution of educational funding has had the effect of reducing historical inequities in 
learning conditions though considerable variation still exists within the public schooling system 
(Department of Education, 2001).  In addition, reform of the curriculum, which is envisaged in the 
'Curriculum 2005' initiative (Department of Education, 2001), has considerable potential to improve the 
productivity of non-Whites (Moll, 1998).  However these changes will have only a gradual impact on the 
racial wage hierarchy as newly-qualified entrants are absorbed into the labour market.  
The multilateral decomposition analysis provides some of the first, detailed evidence about the 
evolution of the wage hierarchy in the post-apartheid era.  We find that the predicted wage differentials 
have fallen somewhat, due in part to a narrowing of the gaps in educational attainment and to the 
greater representation of African and Coloured workers in White-collar jobs in the public sector.  But the 
relative improvement in the measured characteristics of the African workforce at the time of the 
transition to democratic rule has not been sustained in the post-apartheid era.  The residual wage 
differentials have not declined and are virtually constant throughout the entire period.  We show that the 
increasing inequality in the overall distribution of wages has had only a negligible effect on racial wage 
differentials.   
These findings suggest that the policy reforms of the post-apartheid era have yet to have had a 
significant effect on the racial wage hierarchy in the secondary and tertiary sectors.  However, it is too 
early to judge the effectiveness of these reforms given their timing and the endemic nature of the 
problems that they are designed to tackle.  Only time will tell whether they are sufficient to eliminate the 
disadvantages and discrimination faced by non-Whites in the labour market as a legacy of apartheid or 
whether further policy interventions will be needed to achieve this goal. 
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